

VZCZCXRO6444

PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEH DU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA  
RUEHROV

DE RUCNDT #1248/01 1721656

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

P 211656Z JUN 06

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9392

INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0893

RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0728

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0686

RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0066

RUEH MV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY 0585

RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0457

RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0643

RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0846

RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0471

RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0442

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001248

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [SO](#) [UNSC](#) [IGAD](#)

SUBJECT: UNSC/SOMALIA: MOST MEMBERS ANXIOUS FOR ACTION ON  
ARMS EMBARGO EXEMPTION

REF: SECSTATE 99561

1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At June 19 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) consultations on Somalia, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Fall discussed humanitarian, political and security aspects of the current crisis, outlining five possible scenarios that could result from the power struggle between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The first such scenario foresaw an undermined TFG; the second assumed no unified UIC leadership; the third envisaged TFG President Yusuf's assertion of authority in Baidoa; the fourth supposed UIC control of Baidoa; and the fifth imagined outside intervention. Fall reported on the Transitional Parliament's June 14 adoption of a National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP), which recognized deployment of an Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace support operation. According to Fall, preparations for this deployment continue apace, including a request for an exemption of the arms embargo imposed under resolution 733 (1992), and will be presented to the UNSC in July by the African Union (AU) and IGAD. Most Members spoke in favor of a waiver of the embargo to support the TFG in its bid to counter the UIC political (and possibly military) offensive, but there were several hold-outs (including the UK, which had previously been a major proponent of the idea) who went along with Qatari PermRep al-Nassar in his urging the Council against 'short-sightedness' in opting for too hasty a solution to Somalia's complex problems. Chinese efforts to launch a Press Statement at the end of the session were deferred. END SUMMARY.

UIC INTERNAL DIVISIONS CREATE UNCERTAIN FUTURE

2. (SBU) At June 19 UNSC consultations on Somalia, SRSG Fall discussed humanitarian, political and security aspects of the current crisis in the wake of the UIC victory in Mogadishu over forces of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Combat Against Terrorism, two of whose leaders had just left Mogadishu the weekend of June 16. Despite the spread of UIC influence to Jowhar and toward Baidoa, Fall noted that the Union was not monolithic and had no clear internal dynamics,

divided as the movement was along sub-clan lines, each with differing ideologies and with no precise information on exactly who was in overall charge and prepared to address such internal divisions. Fall acknowledged the presence of extremist elements within the UIC which might harbor terrorists sympathetic to al-Qaida among their ranks and which seek to seize power and disrupt the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), in turn creating a re-emergence of the sub-clan rivalries so entrenched in Somali politics. In response to a question from USUN, SRSG Fall said that in his visit during the week of June 12 to Somaliland, President Dahir Rayale Kahin expressed deep concern with the current developments in Somalia, which he feared would disrupt the peace in Somaliland and make Puntland the next UIC target.

13. (SBU) Fall predicted that the UIC's next step would be to consolidate control and impose Sharia law in some areas of Somalia, but he presented five alternative scenarios that could also result from the power struggle between the UIC and the TFG. First, if moderate UIC members asserted control, it would undermine the leadership of the TFG and create sub-clan friction. Fall noted that dialogue between the sides might nonetheless be possible. Second, if no united leadership emerged, the UIC's 'union' would be threatened, allowing the TFG to negotiate with divided elements of its composition. Third, TFG President Yusuf could assert his authority in Baidoa, imposing total military control if the UIC advanced toward the city. However, if Yusuf failed to defend Baidoa, his national credibility and authority would be jeopardized. Fourth, Fall suggested that the UIC could assume control of Baidoa, which would frustrate regional security interests and effectively bring to an end the TFIs. Finally, Fall raised the possibility of interference by regional, sub-regional and

USUN NEW Y 00001248 002 OF 003

international players to challenge the UIC, in the middle of which scenario the TFIs would inevitably be caught. In this regard, Fall cautioned specifically against the intentions of Ethiopia and acknowledged its troop movements to the Somali border in what he considered a 'show of strength' against UIC advances.

14. (SBU) Fall's recommendation was for the Council to continue its close scrutiny of the situation, as the AU was currently doing by featuring Somalia prominently on its agenda, including for an upcoming Peace and Security Council meeting. He pointed out that under the fourth scenario, the TFG would be forced to vacate Baidoa and likely to leave the country, representing a regression in Somali politics to a time when the ruling power could not even reside in-country. To prevent this, Fall recommended the Council adopt a united approach to protect the 'fragile' TFG and TFIs, give the TFG the means to establish a constructive dialogue within the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter and strengthen the TFIs' negotiating position with the UIC. On these three points, the Council was unanimous in its support.

EMBARGO EXEMPTION AS MEANS OF ASSISTING TFG

15. (SBU) Council unanimity evaporated when SRSG Fall reported on the Transitional Parliament's June 14 adoption of a National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP), which inter alia recognized deployment of an IGAD peace support operation. According to Fall, preparations for this deployment had begun April 18 and now continued apace, including a request for an exemption of the arms embargo imposed under resolution 733 (1992), and will be presented to the UNSC in July by the AU and IGAD, per a request from the Council in its March 2006 Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2006/11). Fall noted that the AU and IGAD were meeting June 19 on this topic. Fall identified the issue as two-fold: one problem was the embargo exemption, and the other problem was deployment of forces, against which the UIC was vehemently opposed, insisting instead that Somalis resolve their own security problems and threatening to withdraw its commitment to dialogue with the TFG if such an

operation were to deploy. Deployment also brought to bear divisions within the TFIs, some of whom opposed border states' sending troops to Somalia, as well as within IGAD on the nationality of participating troops.

¶16. (SBU) Most UNSC Members were willing to accept a partial lifting of the embargo to accommodate military assistance to the TFG, including some P-5 members. Chinese PR Wang cited the Liberia sanctions case as a model for the legal channeling of weapons to allow for law enforcement. French PR de La Sabliere argued that a waiver was critical for the international community to ensure integration of militias into the national army and to provide for the creation and training of police forces. The Russian representative urged Council support for the IGAD operation, which would nonetheless require a detailed plan supported by the Somali people. Representatives of Ghana, Argentina and Slovakia expressed moderate support for IGAD's peace support operation. Danish PR and present UNSC President Loj raised the possibility that the operation might not in fact lead to reconciliation, and Tanzanian PR Mahiga inquired about possible repercussions on such a deployment by the reported build-up of Ethiopian troops around Baidoa.

¶17. (SBU) The UK Deputy PR, however, was more cautious than her delegation has been in the past, now saying that the UK supports 'in principle' deployment of a peace support operation but only on the basis of a clear request for it by the TFG and of concrete planning by IGAD and the AU. She argued for a strengthening of UNSCR 733, including consideration of targeted sanctions (NOTE. The UK representative at the June 15 Somalia Contact Group meeting made the same call for targeted sanctions. END NOTE). USUN PolMinsCouns, drawing from reftel points, pointed out that

USUN NEW Y 00001248 003 OF 003

divisions within the UIC, TFIs and IGAD itself made it premature to consider a waiver but agreed with the UK on enforcing the existing embargo provisions. Qatari PR al-Nasser advised the Council against 'short-sightedness' in opting for too hasty a solution to Somalia's complex problems. Tanzanian PR Mahiga reiterated a question he raised in the June 15 Somalia Contact Group meeting about the fate of the Alliance warlords who had left Mogadishu and who had been subsequently banned from Kenyan territory, warning that they, with their deep clan links, could still pose a threat.

#### HUMANITARIAN SITUATION WORSE

¶18. (SBU) SRSG Fall reported that the UN would dispatch later this week an initial mission to Jowhar to meet with the UIC on allowing humanitarian access in areas of greatest need, which had been further exacerbated by the recent fighting and the drought. This mission, he added, would be followed by deployment of humanitarian organizations to Somalia. Members echoed his concerns, calling for increased levels of humanitarian assistance, respect for human rights and involvement by all relevant parties (including the Contact Group, the AU, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and IGAD).

#### DEFERRED PRESS STATEMENT

¶19. (SBU) Due to amendments from the Danish and UK delegations, as well as opposition from USUN, the Chinese delegation opted to defer consideration of its proposed draft Press Statement.  
BOLTON